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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically investigates firms using Islamic finance in Malaysia and
Middle East countries. The comparative analysis of Islamic finance and non-Islamic finance
users resulted in three major implications. First, Islamic bond issuers preferentially choose
the Islamic bond issuance prior to bank borrowing and other external financing tools. Second,
Islamic bond issuance is not related to the issuer’s internal funds, while Islamic bank
borrowing is significantly influenced by the magnitude of a firm’s internal funds. These
results suggest that Islamic bond issuers do not always choose to issue bonds based on
information cost, but Islamic bank borrowers always do. Third, the Islamic bond issuance
contributes to an increase in the issuer’s stock returns and total factor productivity. This
empirical result suggests that Islamic bond issuance is preferred because of this unique
benefit which standard external financing does not have.
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I. Introduction
Islamic financing scheme has recently
emerged as the new international fund source even
for many firms from non-Islamic countries as shown
in the following examples. For instance, total funding
volume by Islamic bond issuance (hearafter referred
as “Sukuk”) as recorded in the London market was as
large as that in the Middle East countries. In East Asia,
the largest Japanese automobile manufacturer, Toyota
Motors, also employed Sukuk as a funding scheme in
July 2008. Realier, in 2007, the world total Sukuk
issuance and Islamic bank borrowing were USD 47
billion and USD 29 billion, respectively. One
important factor for this increasing trend is the
progress achieved towards market oriented economy
by the Islamic world. Reflecting the recent soaring
natural resources prices, incoming cross-border
securities investments to the Islamic countries
dramatically increased which promoted the financial
market development in these areas. In addition,
multi-national firms from non-Islamic countries are
expecting future large returns from the 1.1 billion
population of the Islamic society. Apparently, these
firms employ Islamic finance as a funding scheme as a
way to localize their business operations.
It is well known that Islamic finance has
the characteristics of both debt and equity issuances.
Originally, prohibition of interest receipts or payment
has made this financial scheme a quasi profit sharing
type of finance. Investors and lenders receive some
form of dividends from fund raisers, instead of
interest receipts. The dividends vary depending on
fund raisers’ future profitability. Since Islamic finance
has intermediate characteristics of debt and equity
finance, our overall hypothesis that the determination
of this financing choice is also an intermediate
determinant between debt and equity issuance. There
are many literatures on corporate capital structure
based on pecking order and trade off theory.
However, few literatures examine Islamic finance
using the theory of capital structure. Our major aim in
this paper is to determine if Islamic finance imposes
larger agency costs to investors or if it brings an
additional unique benefit to users. Hence, our
analysis will attempt to identify the determinants of
Islamic finance use from the theory of capital
structure. We believe it contributes to explain the
recent development of Islamic finance market.
This study first presents the recent
developments of the Sukuk issuance and the Islamic
borrowing markets by showing our empirical data. In
the following two sections, we introduce our
hypotheses, how it interacts with existing literature
and empirical methodology. Sections III-V, show the
empirical models and the results. Based on the three
empirical results, we derive implications and provide
conclusions of this study in a final section.
II. Backgrounds
The size of Sukuk market was USD 400
million by end December 1995, but it dramatically
expanded since 2001. Volume of the primary market
in 2007 was recorded USD 47 billion, 60 times as large
as that of 2001. Such recent dramatic increase could be
attributed to the Kuala Lumpur market development
promotion by the Malaysian government. This
government’s promotional policy triggered an
increase in several new types of bond issuance such
as Ijara Sukuk, Musharakah Sukuk as the government
provided preferential tax treatments for them. The
increase in the number of Sukuk schemes also
encouraged the participation of fund raisers to choose
the most appropriate schemes among them.
The recent remarkable trend of the Sukuk
market development is longer bond maturity and
high credit rating. Sukuk with over five year
maturities accounts for more than 69 percent of the
total Sukuk issued in 2001-2008 with more than 29
percent of the total accounted for by the over ten-year
maturity bonds. Furthermore, the Malaysian credit
rating agency, MARC, provided “AAA”, “AA” and
“A” to eighteen percent, twenty percent and sixty one
percent of the total Sukuk issued in Malaysia,
respectively. Total ninety nine percent of the Sukuk
issued in Malaysia has at least more than “A” rating
in the primary market. Remarkably, no default deal
has been announced since 2001.
Development of the Islamic banking
market was not remarkable until 2004, reflecting some
development delays of a few years after the Sukuk
growth. While the Sukuk market development is led
by Malaysia, that of the Islamic banking is pulled by
Middle East countries. Saudi Arabia has the largest
Islamic banking market recording USD 17 billion
from January to June 2008. The second largest market
is the United Arab Emirates with USD 9 billion in the
above period. Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC)
countries, meanwhile, deregulated the new entry of
foreign banks since 2005, contributing to the dramatic
expansion of Islamic banking market since then.
Table.1 Total Funding Volume of Islamic Finance by Region ( in USD million)
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Source: Author’s calculation based on ISI Emerging Markets.
Note: GCC 6 countries consist of United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
Table 2. Total Funding Volume of Sukuk Issuance in Malaysia by Type (in USD
million)
Source: Author’s calculation based on ISI Emerging Markets.
III. Existing Literatures and Testing
Hypotheses
The number of literatures focusing on
Islamic finance from the view point of corporate
finance is not large. Other than that of Aggarwal and
Yousef (2000), we cannot find any focusing on capital
structure. Their paper examined and compared the
behavior of the Islamic banking activity with the
non-Islamic banking sector, and confirmed that
Islamic banking has the characteristics of both debt
financingg and equity issuance. In other words,
Islamic funding avoiding interest payment/receipt
has very close characteristics with profit-sharing type
of financing. Benefits of money suppliers, i.e.,
investors and banks, for instance, depends on future
profitability of the issuers/borrowers in this case.
Therefore, investors and banks must monitor the
performance of fund raisers, more carefully. This
finding intuitively points that the choice for Islamic
finance depends on information costs between
corporate insiders and outsiders.
As shown by Myers and Majluf (1984),
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Rajan and Zingales
(1995), many literatures focused on the funding order
from the asymmetric information in the corporate
finance theory. This paper first examines if agency
cost influences the choice for Islamic finance by
looking at funding order. Our hypothesis is that the
Islamic finance is chosen prior to equity finance, but
subordinated to the normal bond issuance and bank
borrowings. Similar to profit sharing type of firms,
the choice for a financing scheme is based on
information cost, i.e., size of the information cost of
Islamic finance between debt finance and equity
issuance. Taking examples of fund raisers in Malaysia
and Middle East countries, this paper empirically
verifies the order of the Islamic finance. Bolton and
Freixas (2001) discussed the determinants of bond
issuance of firms, i.e., the choice of bond issuance and
bank borrowing depends on flexibility of negotiation
between fund raisers and money suppliers. Our first
analysis also considers comparison of the direct and
indirect financing tools.
Part two of this paper further analysed
bond issuance based on trade-off theory. The trade-off
theory argues that firms balance the benefits of debt
against the cost of debt and the capital structure is
then determined. Existing literature suggests that
pecking order and trade-off theories are mutually
correlated. Jensen and Meckling (1976) regards
information cost as a kind of cost of debt. Ang et. al.
Sukuk Issuance Islamic Bank Borrowing
Total Malaysia GCC 6 Others Total Malaysia GCC 6 Others
2005 12,034 8,747 2,341 946 8,528 102 7,848 578
(100.0%) (72.7%) (19.5%) (7.9%) (70.9%) (0.8%) (65.2%) (4.8%)
2006 27,167 15,048 11,191 928 19,273 230 18,443 600
(100.0%) (55.4%) (41.2%) (3.4%) (70.9%) (0.8%) (67.9%) (2.2%)
2007 46,950 26,529 18,710 1,711 29,312 70 22,230 7,011
(100.0%) (56.5%) (39.9%) (3.6%) (62.4%) (0.2%) (47.3%) (14.9%)
Total Ijara Sukuk
Murabahah
Sukuk
Mudarabah
Sukuk
Musharakah
Sukuk
Others
2003 4,072 350 920 939 0 1,863
(100.0%) (8.6%) (22.6%) (23.1%) (0.0%) (45.7%)
2005 8,747 2,028 3,737 26 1,840 1,116
(100.0%) (23.2%) (42.7%) (0.3%) (21.0%) (12.8%)
2007 26,529 4,105 8,516 2,743 5,806 5,359
(100.0%) (15.5%) (32.1%) (10.3%) (21.9%) (20.2%)
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(1982) also picked up bankruptcy cost as an example
of cost of debt. Thus, there can be a variety of
definitions of benefit and cost of debt. Our hypothesis
is that Islamic finance markets attract potential
participants when the financing brings in an
additional benefit which normal traditional external
finance does not provide. We test this hypothesis by
taking as an example the shareholder’s value and
total factor productivity. In addition to literatures
based on pecking order and trade off theory, there
exist other literatures on Islamic finance. Dhumale
and Sapcanin (1999), Errico and Farahbaksh (1998),
Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) and Khan(1989) discussed
the possibilities and perspectives of Islamic finance as
a new development financing scheme and
appropriate financial supervision called for 1 .
However, the studies did not focus on corporate
financing aspect.
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), many
literatures suggest that firm’s capital structure is not
always neutral to the firm’s performance in the
product market, but does influence it from the view
point of asymmetric information and trade off theory.
This paper also examines and determines if the choice
for Islamic financing influences the corporate
performance in the post funding period.
IV. Data
Our study uses the Islamic finance deal
data from ISI Emerging Markets, Inc. and matches
them with the Thomson Reuters financial data. We
first compared three Islamic financing deal data, i.e.,
Bloomberg LP., Thomson Reuters and ISI Emerging
Markets. We employed ISI Emerging Markets because
neither Bloomberg nor Thomson Reuters provide
information on the type of Islamic financing and we
cannot accordingly distinguish types of deals, i.e.,
Ijara, Musharakah and Mudarabah. In addition, these
data sources do not provide Islamic banking data,
either. The above qualitative information on the type
and other Islamic banking data are absolutely
necessary for our study. Since ISI provides such
qualitative information and banking data, but does
not have financial data of the fund raisers. Therefore,
we matched the financial data of the Thomson
Reuters with the ISI’s deal data. As for the firm’s
1 Dr. Kuran of South California University wrote a
series prominent literature on Islamic finance by
verifying how Islamic finance had contributed to
economic development in the Islamic society since the
1980s. Recent studies by Kuran (2005) (2004) (2003)
also focused on this matter from corporate financing
view.
financial data, Thomson Reuters financial data,
originally known as “Worldscope”, is more useful
than Bloomberg since it includes delisted and newly
listed firms.
The ISI Emerging Market provides the
2001-2007 sample deal data for Sukuk and 2004-2007
data for Islamic banking. Although sample period of
the Sukuk and Islamic banking data are different, we
consider the bias, if any, as insignificant since the
number of issuers and borrowers is quite small
during 2001-2003. The matched data between ISI’s
deal and Thomson Reuters financial data resulted in
the following results. In Malaysia, 417 firms issued a
total USD 61 billion of Sukuk in 2001-2007. Of these
firms, 76 are listed. The annual average number of
Malaysian listed firms is 990 firms, hence, there are 76
issuers and 914 non-issuers. As for Islamic bank
borrowing, a total of USD50 billion were borrowed by
GCC firms in 2004-2007. There were 86 firms that
borrowed, of which 29 firms are listed.
As Malaysian issuers are not concentrated
on a limited number of industrial sectors, the number
of manufacturing issuers is as large as those of banks
and real estate business firms. DRB-Hicom, Tracoma
Holdings are issuers from automobiles and parts
industries and Forms Resources, Symphony House
are those from electronics industries. No particular
industry accounts for more than 30 percent of the
market. On the other hand, one remarkable difference
between issuers and non-issuers is the firm size and
profitability. Averages of these indicators of issuers
statistically exceed those of non-issuers.
Different from Sukuk sample data, GCC
Islamic banking borrowers mainly belong to
commercial banks or real estate business sector.
Emirates Islamic Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank and Saudi
British Bank are frequent borrowers of the Islamic
banking market. In addition, non-bank business
borrowers such as National Leasing Inc. and Kuwait
Finance House are also participants of the market.
Since interbank market is undeveloped in the region,
Islamic banking market seems to be used as a
short-term funding tool by banks. Other than
commercial banks and non-banks, real estate business
participants are main borrowers in the market. These
firms generally have large firm size since they have
their own real estate or commercial/residential
buildings as their assets. Therefore, the firm size of
the Islamic bank borrowers is larger than other listed
firms in the region. Averages of firm’s profitability of
the Islamic banking borrowers are also statistically
larger than that of non-borrowers due to the recent
real estate boom in the region.
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Table 3. Overview of Sample Data (in USD million)
Source: Author’s estimates based on ISI Emerging Markets.
Table 4. Average Size, Profitability and Growth of Sukuk Issuers in Malaysia (in USD
million)
Source: ISI Emerging Markets.
Notes:
1: The t-test for difference of averages between issuers and non-issuers are indicated as ***, ** and * for 1 percent,
5 percent and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively.
2: “Market to Book Ratio” is used as a proxy for a firm’s future growth opportunity .
Table 5. Average Size, Profitability and Growth of Islamic Bank Borrowers in GCC (in USD
million)
Source: ISI Emerging Markets
Notes:
1: The t-test for difference of averages between issuers and non-issuers are indicated as ***, ** and * for 1 percent,
5 percent and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively.
Listed Firms Listed Firms
2001 680 3 0
2002 761 4 0
2003 4,072 25 10
2004 4,949 48 14 1,178 4 2
2005 8,747 71 18 7,848 16 4
2006 15,048 150 18 18,443 28 10
2007 26,529 116 16 22,230 38 13
Total 60,786 417 76 49,699 86 29
Year Average 8,684 60 11 12,425 22 7
Amount
Issued
Number of
Issuers
Amount
Issued
Number of
Issuers
(b) Islamic Banking Borrowers in GCC(a) Sukuk Issures in Malaysia
Sukuk Issuers （N=48)
Non-Sukuk Issuers（N=941)
t-test Results for Difference between
Issuers and Non-issuers Averages
Issuers >Non-
Issuers
***
Issuers >Non-
Issuers
***
Issuers <Non-
Issuers
***
389 1.200 1.197
Total Assets Return on Assets (%) Market to Book Ratio
4,499 3.361 1.061
Islamic Bank Borrowers（N=25)
Non-Islamic Bank Borrowers (N=440)
t-test Results for Difference between
Issuers and Non-issuers Averages
Issuers >Non-
Issuers
*** Issuers >Non-
Issuers
* Insignificant
4,294 5.876 3.224
Total Assets Return on Assets (%) Market to Book Ratio
19,818 6.989 1.376
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2: “Market to Book Ratio” is used as a proxy for firm’s future growth opportunity.
3: GCC 6 countries are United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
III. Empirical Analysis 1: Common
Characteristics of Islamic Finance Users
1. Determinants of Sukuk Issuance
The first empirical analysis of this paper
focuses on the determinants of Sukuk issuance and
examines the information cost of financing. As noted
in the previous section, Sukuk is categorized as an
intermediate corporate financing tool between fixed
interest securities and equity issuance. Sukuk is
originally structured to avoid interest
payment/receipt in a financial market and investors
accordingly receive dividends from the issuer’s future
profit, instead. Thus, this profit sharing type of
financial tool depends on internal information of the
issuers when investors would like to receive the
maximum dividends. In this paper, our hypothesis of
this is information cost of Sukuk issuance is between
normal debt finance and equity issuance; the choice of
this financing tool is accordingly subordinated to
normal debt finance, but prior to equity issuance
according to pecking order theory. Another
hypothesis which is based on trade-off theory is that
Sukuk is chosen prior to the above external financing
when the financial scheme provides managerial
merits to the issuer. We analyze this financial order
by examining the following empirical equations:
（A)
itit
ititit
ititititit
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131211 _
SUKUK : Sukuk Issued divided by book value of total
liability, ROA : EBITDA divided by book value of
total assets, CFlow : cashflow divided by total sales,
SIZE : natural logarithm of book value of total assets,
MBR : book value of liability plus market value of
capital divided by book value of total assets, BANK :
Bank borrowing plus inter-firm borrowing plus other
debt increase divided by book value of total liability,
PIslam _ : accumulated Sukuk issued by previous
year divided by book value of liability, BONDN _ :
accumulated normal bond issued by this year divided
by book value of liability, DER : book value of
liability divided by market value of capital, Year01
-Year05: year dummy variables, DUM1: =1 when the
firm is real estate, building materials, engineering and
construction, others=0, DUM2: =1 when the firm is
coal, gas, mining, oil and the suppliers of energy,
others =0, DUM3: =1 when the firm is a commercial
bank, insurance firm, venture capital, investment
fund and other financial firm, others =0, DUM4: =1
when the firm is electronics, internet provider,
semiconductor manufacture, software and
telecommunications, others=0
Variables of the empirical model (A) are
employed to examine the determinants of Sukuk
issuance. In this model, we assume that internal
funding ability and bank borrowing influences the
issuance of Sukuk. In our hypothesis, the parameter
of the proxy of internal fund, i.e., ROA, Cash Flow
and bank borrowing are negative as those are chosen
prior to the Sukuk. Model (A) also includes the
issuer’s growth opportunity, i.e., market to book ratio,
debt to equity ratio, and the past issuance experience
of Sukuk and the normal bond issuance as possible
determinants that might influence Sukuk issuance.
Since we estimate model (A) to verify financial order
of Sukuk issuance based on information cost,
parameter of accumulated normal bond issued by
previous year is negative as this is prior to Sukuk
issuance. Model (B) tries to find out if the Sukuk
issuance crowd outs the use of the normal bond
issuance. Our hypothesis is that the parameter of past
Sukuk issuance experience is negative. In other words,
the Sukuk is chosen prior to the normal bond issuance
based on Trade-off theory. The empirical model (C)
verifies if the past Sukuk issuance experience
influences the bank borrowing as well. Our
hypothesis is that the parameter of the Sukuk
issuance experience is also negative based on
trade-off theory.
The empirical results estimated by panel
tobit estimation are summarized as follows. Under
model (A), six equations are estimated to avoid
possible correlations among the independent
variables and confirm the robustness of the equations.
The empirical results (a) to (f) suggest that natural
logarithm of total asset, i.e., proxy of firm size, is
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positively related to the Sukuk issuance. These
positive parameters imply that large firms can access
the Sukuk funding market more easily. In addition,
what the empirical result of (e) suggests is that Sukuk
is chosen by firms that have past issuance experiences.
Firms without any previous experience of Sukuk
issuance hardly employ this financing tool. In
summary, it can be stated that two common
characteristics of Sukuk issuers are large firm size and
past Sukuk issuance experience .
The empirical results for models (B) and
(C) are indicated as empirical results (g) and (h) in
Table 5B. Empirical result (g) suggests that past
Sukuk issuance experience negatively influences the
issuance of normal bonds for the current financial
year. Empirical result (f) of model (A) indicates that
normal bond issuance of the previous financial year
does not influence the current year Sukuk Issuance.
Therefore, issuance of Sukuk is considered to be
chosen prior to the normal bond issuance. In addition,
empirical result (h) of model (C) indicates that Sukuk
issuance negatively influences the bank borrowing,
while the parameter of Sukuk is insignificant in
empirical result (d). These empirical results imply
that Sukuk issuance influences both the normal bond
issuance and bank borrowing, but neither the normal
bond issuance nor bank borrowing influences the
Sukuk issuance.
Table 5A. Empirical Results 1 : Determinants of Sukuk Issuance
Islamic Finance and the Theory of
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Notes:
*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence or less;
** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 5 percent level of confidence
* indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10 percent level of confidence
Table 5B. Empirical Results 2 : Determinants of Sukuk Issuance
Model (A)
(a) Dep. Var.= Sukuk (b) Dep. Var.= Sukuk (c) Dep. Var.= Sukuk
ROA 4.1E-05 (0.010)
CFlow -1.2E-04 (-0.040)
SIZE 0.001 * (1.840) 0.001 * (1.790) 0.001 * (1.880)
MBR 1.6E-04 (0.260)
BANK
Islam_P
N_BOND
DER -0.001 *** (-2.560) -3.7E-04 *** (-2.560) -0.001 *** (-2.580)
Dum1 -0.001 (-0.570) -0.001 (-0.560) -0.001 (-0.550)
Dum2 0.011 *** (2.860) 0.011 *** (2.870) 0.011 *** (2.820)
Dum3 -0.004 (-1.300) -0.004 (-1.270) -0.004 (-1.300)
Dum4 -0.001 (-0.610) -0.001 (1.180) -0.001 (-0.640)
Year01 0.003 (1.350) 0.003 (1.350) 0.003 (1.340)
Year02 0.002 (1.170) 0.002 (1.180) 0.002 (1.170)
Year03 0.005 ** (2.440) 0.005 ** (2.430) 0.005 ** (2.430)
Year04 0.005 ** (2.210) 0.005 ** (2.210) 0.005 ** (2.200)
Year05 0.002 (1.030) 0.002 (1.030) 0.002 (1.040)
Const -0.002 (1.040) -0.004 (-1.480) -0.005 (-1.520)
Wald chi2 22.060 ** 21.960 ** 22.130 **
rho 0.005 0.007 0.005
Likelihood Ratio of sigma_u 11.130 *** 10.220 *** 10.120 ***
Observations 4,620 4,602 4,620
Firms 955 954 955
Model (A)
(d) Dep. Var.= Sukuk (e) Dep. Var.= Sukuk (f) Dep. Var.= Sukuk
ROA
CFlow
SIZE 0.001 * (1.850) 0.001 ** (2.000) 0.001 ** (2.140)
MBR
BANK -2.2E-07 (-0.010)
Islam_P 0.004 * (1.710)
N_BOND 6.7E-05 (0.690)
DER
Dum1 -0.001 (-0.560) -0.001 (-0.620) -0.001 (-0.620)
Dum2 0.011 *** (2.910) 0.009 *** (2.740) 0.009 *** (2.760)
Dum3 0.000 (-1.360) -0.004 (-1.480) -0.004 (-1.480)
Dum4 -0.001 (-0.600) -0.001 (-0.560) -0.001 (-0.550)
Year01 0.003 (1.340) 0.002 (1.310) 0.002 (1.310)
Year02 0.002 (1.140) 0.002 (1.110) 0.002 (1.100)
Year03 0.005 ** (2.500) 0.005 ** (2.410) 0.005 ** (2.400)
Year04 0.005 ** (2.230) 0.004 ** (2.170) 0.004 ** (2.160)
Year05 0.002 (1.030) 0.002 (1.260) 0.002 (1.260)
Const -0.004 (-1.520) -0.004 (-1.720) -0.004 (-1.710)
Wald chi2 22.550 ** 22.330 ** 22.490 **
rho 0.005 0.003 0.001
Likelihood Ratio of sigma_u 21.160 *** 17.040 *** 15.010 ***
Observations 4,708 5,064 5,059
Firms 951 973 973
Islamic Finance and the Theory of
Capital Structure / Mamoru Nagano
Discussion Papers in Economics No. 501
Society of Economics Nagoya City University
9
Notes:
*** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence or less
** indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence
* indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence
2. Determinants of Islamic Bank
Borrowing
This section examines the determinants of
another Islamic financing tool, i.e., Islamic bank
borrowing. While Malaysia is the world largest Sukuk
market, firms rarely choose Islamic banking as a
financing scheme. GCC countries Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Abab
Emirates hold the world’s largest Islamic banking
market. We empirically verify the characteristics of
the firms that promote and determine the use of
Islamic borrowing and the funding order of the
borrowing. To examine the above propositions, we
employed these equations:
(D)
ititit
itititit
PIslamBBANKB
DERBSIZEBROABconstIslamB


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


1514
131211
_
IslamB : amount borrowed as Islamic bank borrowing
divided by book value of total liability, ROAB : EBITDA
divided by book value of book value of total assets,
SIZEB : natural logarithm of book value of total assets,
BANKB : Bank borrowing plus inter-firm borrowing plus
other debt increase divided by book value of total liability,
PIslamB _ : accumulated Islamic bank borrowing by
previous year divided by book value of liability, DERB :
book value of liability divided by market value of capital,
Year01 -Year05: year dummy variables, DUM1: =1 when the
firm is real estate, building materials, engineering and
construction, others=0, DUM2: =1 when the firm is coal, gas,
mining, oil and the suppliers of energy, others =0, DUM3: =1
when the firm is a commercial bank, insurance firm, venture
capital, investment fund and other financial firm, others =0,
CDUM1-CDUM5: country dummy variables, i.e., CDUM1:
=1 when the firm headquarters is in United Arab Emirates,
CDUM2:=1 when the firm headquarters is in Kuwait,
CDUM3: =1 when the firm headquarters is in Bahrain,
CDUM4: =1 when the firm headquarters is in Oman,
CDUM5: =1 when the firm headquarters is in Qatar.
Equation (D) above employs the variables
based on the following hypotheses. First, ROAB is
chosen as a proxy of the firm’s internal funding
ability. We argue that firms with large internal funds
do not have to participate in Islamic banking market
as borrowers. SIZEB is a natural logarithm of book
value of firm’s total assets. Our hypothesis is that
large firms are mostly those have long been
established and have a channel to this funding market.
BANKB is used as a proxy of firm’s dependency on
non-Islamic bank borrowing or inter-firm credit. Our
hypothesis is that high BANKB firms avoid
participating in the Islamic borrowing market. Here,
we assume the normal bank borrowing or inter-firm
credit is preferentially chosen to Islamic bank
borrowing. IslamB_P is a variable that represents the
past experience of Islamic bank borrowing. Our
Model (B) Model (C)
(g) Dep. Var.= N_BOND (h) Dep. Var.= BANK
ROA -1.2E+00 *** (-15.610) -5.241 *** (-3.740)
CFlow
SIZE -0.005 (-0.460) 2.019 *** (4.140)
MBR
Islam_P -0.570 * (-1.910) -0.335 * (-1.750)
DER -0.004 ** (-2.170) -3.3E-01 *** (-2.782)
Dum1 -0.006 (-0.110) -0.989 (-0.320)
Dum2 0.110 (1.160) -0.010 (-0.180)
Dum3 0.151 ** (2.050) -6.636 (-1.550)
Year01 0.064 (1.230) 0.537 (0.670)
Year02 0.036 (0.680) 0.305 (0.380)
Year03 0.103 (1.940) 0.924 (1.140)
Year04 0.303 (0.580) 1.225 (1.500)
Year05 0.032 (0.570) 0.386 (0.470)
Const 0.043 (0.590) -12.614 *** (-4.560)
Wald chi2 262.610 *** 32.560 ***
rho 0.007 0.747
Likelihod Ratio of sigma_u 37.210 *** 27.560 ***
Observations 4,617 4,483
Firms 955 942
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hypothesis, in this regard, is that firms that have past
Islamic borrowing experience can easily access this
market. We employed Panel Tobit and GMM
estimation and made three types of estimations to
avoid possible correlation among the independent
variables and confirm the robustness of the results.
Table 6 suggests that the parameters of
ROAB are significantly negative as shown in
empirical results (i) – (k), This is the major difference
with the empirical result of Sukuk issuance. Firms
with huge internal funds avoid Islamic bank
borrowing, while Malaysian firms issues Sukuk
regardless of the magnitude of their internal funding
abilities. Islamic bank borrowing is chosen by large
firms which is also true for Sukuk issuance. The
empirical results (i) to (k) suggest that industrial
concentration of Islamic bank borrowing users is
remarkable in this case. Especially, firms in industrial
sectors of real estate and urban development business
are frequent Islamic banking borrowers.
Table 6. Determinants of Islamic Bank Borrowers: Empirical Results
Notes:
1 : ***, **, * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels of confidence, respectively.
2 : Equations (i) and (j) are estimated by panel tobit estimation and (k) is by GMM estimation.
IV. Empirical Analysis 2: Islamic
Bond Issuers and Shareholder’s Value
A major finding of the previous section is
that Sukuk issuance is resorted to prior to normal
external finance, but the relationship with a firm’s
internal funds is insignificant. On the other hand, as
for Islamic bank borrowing, significant negative
relationship exists between internal funds and the
Islamic bank borrowing. The first result does not
support the pecking order theory while the second is
subordinated to the internal funds when information
cost is the smallest. These results support the
observation that firms choose Islamic banking
depending on the information costs, but Sukuk
issuance does not consider the magnitude of the
information cost. Therefore, we need to explore
further evidence of Sukuk issuance, and why this
financing scheme is chosen regardless of the internal
funds.
(i) Dep. Var.= IslamB (j) Dep. Var.= IslamB (k) Dep. Var.= IslamB
IslamB(-1) 0.036 (0.673)
ROAB -8.9E-03 *** (-3.060) -0.002 * (-1.660) -0.009 * (1.900)
SIZEB 0.009 ** (2.430) 0.003 * (1.750) 0.005 * (1.880)
DERB 0.002 * (1.768) 0.006 (1.490) 0.182 (1.540)
BANKB -0.002 (-0.690) 0.181 ** (2.540)
IslamB_P 0.181 *** (4.430)
Dum1 0.258 ** (2.190) 0.367 ** (2.120) 0.219 *** (3.560)
Dum2 0.007 (0.260) 0.238 (0.620) 0.301 (0.570)
Dum3 -0.003 (-0.300) -0.005 (-0.340) -0.008 (-0.400)
cdum1 0.011 (0.590) 0.265 (1.030) 0.327 (0.930)
cdum2 -0.003 (-0.210) -0.001 (-0.000) -0.002 (-0.500)
cdum3 -0.079 *** (-3.410) -0.009 *** (-4.030) -0.016 ** (-2.370)
cdum4 0.097 (0.530) 0.153 (0.590) 0.188 (0.530)
cdum5 0.004 *** (3.180) 0.003 *** (2.840) 0.037 ** (2.080)
Year01 0.053 (0.750) 0.051 (0.500) 0.116 (1.460)
Year02 -0.004 (-0.270) 0.256 (1.040) 0.362 (1.060)
Year03 -0.006 (-0.330) 0.997 *** (3.800)
Const -0.008 (-0.200) -1.873 ** (-1.860) -3.166 ** (-2.060)
Wald chi2 22.340 ** 32.480 ** 13.490 *
rho 0.094 0.139 18.000
Likelihood Ratio of sigma_u 27.200 *** 3.910 *
Observations 1,502 1,502 653
Firms 481 481 365
Number of Instruments 18
Model (D)
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Insignificant relationship between Sukuk
issuance and the internal funds suggests that issuers
were even cash affluent in some cases. This suggests
that firms issue Sukuk to obtain other benefit no
matter how large the information cost is. Our first
hypothesis on this is that firms obtain an increase in
the corporate value by issuing Sukuk. To examine this
hypothesis, we employed event-study methodology
of Brown and Warner (1985) and compared
shareholder’s values between Sukuk issuers and
normal bond issuers. We first adopt a standard event
study methodology to calculate abnormal returns
originally developed by Brown and Warner (1985).
The abnormal returns over three-day event window
(-1, 1), eleven days event window (-5, 5), twenty one
days event window (-10, 10) and forty one days event
window (-20,20) around the issuance date using
market model benchmark returns were estimated and
market benchmark indexes were respectively
extracted from the Kuala Lumpur market. By
calculating abnormal returns of the above short-term
and long-term event windows, we discussed the
sources and origins of this abnormal return
differences. The parameters for the market model
were estimated over the (-250,-21) interval.
Table 7 shows the cumulative abnormal
returns classified by Islamic and non Islamic issuers.
In table 7, cumulative abnormal returns of Sukuk
issuers are significantly positive no matter what the
length of the event windows are. However, in case of
normal bond issuers, the returns are insignificant,
commonly. As for the difference in the cumulative
abnormal returns between Sukuk issuers and normal
bond issuers, difference of the return is significantly
positive. To summarize, these empirical results
suggest that Sukuk issuance obviously influences the
stock price of the issuers, while the normal bond
issuance does not as intuitively perceived.
Table 7. Shareholder’s Value of Bond Issuers: Empirical Results
Notes:
1. Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers are calculated for the three-day (-1, 1), eleven days (-5, 5), twenty
one days (-10, 10) and forty one-day (-20, 20) events around the announcement of a takeover. Abnormal returns
are estimated using market index returns of mother country market of each acquirer. The parameters for the
market model are estimated over the (-250,-21) interval. All issuers are publicly traded listed on the
domestic/foreign stock exchange.
2. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level of confidence, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level of confidence
and * denotes significance at 10 percent level of confidence.
V. Empirical Analysis 3: Islamic
Finance and the Firm’s Productivity
Sukuk issuance is preferentially chosen as a
funding scheme as it brings higher stock returns as
examined in the previous section. This section
provides further verification of this result. Our
hypothesis of this increasing shareholder’s value
origin is where the issuer enhances the
competitiveness in the product market through an
improvement of the consumer’s credibility and their
(-1, 1) Mean 3.11% *** [5.71] -0.14% [-0.37] 3.25% *** [5.08]
Median 1.85% *** [5.53] -0.06% [-0.47] 1.91% *** [4.58]
(-5, 5) Mean 12.43% *** [6.03] 0.51% [0.38] 11.92% *** [5.04]
Median 8.36% *** [6.30] -0.17% [-0.02] 8.53% *** [3.93]
(-10, 10) Mean 20.39% *** [6.71] 1.15% [0.52] 19.24% *** [5.26]
Median 15.26% *** [6.45] 0.30% [0.33] 14.96% *** [5.09]
(-20, 20) Mean 31.88% *** [6.77] 2.65% [0.59] 29.23% *** [4.40]
Median 23.76% *** [6.07] 0.47% [0.01] 23.29% *** [5.28]
Observations 72 91
(i) Sukuk Issuers (j) Normal Bond Issuers (k) Difference
(1) (2) (2)-(3)
Islamic Finance and the Theory of
Capital Structure / Mamoru Nagano
Discussion Papers in Economics No. 501
Society of Economics Nagoya City University
12
organizational reputation. Final consumers support
firms funded by Islamic finance if the quality of the
products is as competitive as other firms in the
Islamic society. Since it is difficult to estimate these
qualitative values of credibility and reputation
directly, we employed the following empirical
equations to assess the issuer’s post issuance
performance.
(E)
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GTFP : average total factor productivity (2002-2006),
SUKKA : Sukuk issued divided by total liability (2002-2006
average), SHARE : total sales divided by aggregated sales
of same SIC code of listed firms, IJARA : =1 when the
type of Sukuk is Ijara Sukuk others are =0, Musharaka : =1
when the type of Sukuk is Musharakah Sukuk others are =0,
Mudharabah : =1 when the type of Sukuk is Mudharabah
Sukuk, others are =0, DUM1: =1 when the firm is real estate,
building materials, engineering and construction, others=0,
DUM2: =1 when the firm is coal, gas, mining, oil and the
suppliers of energy, others =0, DUM3: =1 when the firm is a
commercial bank, insurance firm, venture capital,
investment fund and other financial firm, others =0, DUM4:
=1 when the firm is electronics, internet provider,
semiconductor manufacture, software and
telecommunications, others=0, SALES : average sales
growth(2002-2006), LABOR : average number of employee
growth (2002-2006), MATERIAL : average cost of raw
materials growth (2002-2006), CAPITAL : average capital
stock growth (2002-2006),  , are respectively share of
personnel expenses and cost of raw materials to the total
sales. Total sales and cost of raw materials are deflated by
GDP deflator.
Re
Empirical model of (E)-(F) did not use
panel data, but cross-sectional data of the listed firms
since the methodology of total factor productivity
estimation could not be done without obtaining time
series data by each firm. Hence, GTFP is calculated
from the 2002-2006 data for each listed firms. We
accordingly employed the independent variable of
the five year average 2002-2006. Our empirical results
are as follows. The parameter of Sukuk issued
divided by total liability is significantly positive. The
parameter of the firm’s market share is insignificant,
but the intersected variables between market share
and the Sukuk issued divided by total liability is
significantly positive. To examine the robustness of
the above equations, this section also shows the result
of additional test of (F) in addition to the equation (E).
The above results are also found in this additional
model.
Table 8. Sukuk Issuance and Total Factor Productivity: Empirical Results
Notes:
(l) Dep. Var.= GTFP (m) Dep. Var.= GTFP
SUKKA 1.4E+00 *** (2.790) 1.576 ** (2.000)
Share -0.110 (-1.070) -1.2E-01 (-0.740)
SUKKA*Share 0.565 *** (2.940) 0.587 * (1.810)
SK^2 -0.253 (-0.080) 9.1E-02 (0.380)
SH^2 0.094 (0.760) 0.123 (0.510)
ROAA -5.3E-05 (-2.782)
SIZEA -0.011 (-1.290)
DERA 0.001 (0.310)
Ijara 0.032 (0.320) 0.053 (0.460)
Musharakah 0.064 (0.490) 0.030 (0.150)
Mudharabah 0.001 (0.322) 0.017 (0.300)
Dum1 -0.009 (-0.460) -0.005 (-0.180)
Dum2 0.034 (1.020) 0.052 (0.880)
Dum3 -0.003 (-0.120) 0.016 (0.410)
Dum4 -0.004 (-0.200) 0.013 (0.340)
Const 0.011 (1.530) 0.059 (1.590)
Adj R-squared 0.005 0.004
Observations 970 616
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1 : ***, **, * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels of confidence, respectively.
2 : Equations (l) and (m) are estimated by ordinary least squares.
VI. Discussion
A subsidiary of the Japanese supermarket,
AEON Credit Service, issued USD56 million of
Musharakah Sukuk in January, May and October in
2007. During our interview survey with them in 2006,
financial officers of AEON Credit Service mentioned
that their ROA and Capital Adequacy Ratio of the
firm are high enough and they would not have
originally depended on external funding market for
their corporate finance. This preliminary interview
survey is a background of our hypothesis and
suggests that the Sukuk issuance is not determined
depending on information cost, but other managerial
merits as shown in our empirical results.
Our empirical results also suggest that
Islamic bank borrowing is, on the other hand,
positioned as one of the corporate financing tools in
GCC countries. Here, explanatory power of pecking
order theory is high. However, this funding scheme is
used by firms in a limited number of industrial
categories and not many firms have access to this
funding market. Real estate and the urban
development business are among these industrial
categories and these firms usually have large assets
for their commercial activities. This is one of the
reasons why common characteristics of Islamic
banking users are firms which are large. Our
empirical results of Sukuk and Islamic bank
borrowing pointed out that determinants of these
financing choices are different. Therefore, we must
recognize that participants in the Malaysian market
and those in GCC Islamic banking market have a
different purpose for their market entry.
One of the remarkable points of our
empirical results is that the relationship between the
firms’ internal funds and Sukuk issuances are
insignificant. This suggests that even firms with huge
internal funds might even issue Sukuk. We
hypothesize that the issuer’s purpose is to enhance
competitiveness in the product market through an
improvement in final consumer’s credibility.
Although it is difficult to estimate the competitiveness
and the credibility, directly, we examined this by
looking at shareholder’s value and total factor
productivity before and after the issuance and found
these two indicators support the hypothesis. This
evidence suggests that direct financing tool of Sukuk
issuance is more convenient for firms that would like
to make a new entry in the local Islamic product
market. Therefore, this could be an important factor
in the dramatic expansion of the Sukuk market in the
recent years.
Friedman (1970) defined a firm as “That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance
with their desires, which generally will be to make as
much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law
and those embodied in ethical custom.” In this regard,
it is understandable that Shariah qualified Islamic
finance is ethically preferred because of the latter
reason. However, there are recent discussions of this
matter focusing on socially responsible ethical custom
that may reduce shareholder’s value. Since Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Easterbrook and Fishel (1991)
regard corporate activities as the “nexus of contracts”
between the suppliers of various factors of
productions and shareholders have no contractual
guarantee of a fixed payment from the activities,
pursuit of the social contribution is not appropriate
for the firm. These literatures suggest that Islamic
finance consequently reduce the corporate value and
it must not be used if this finance deteriorates the
managerial performance. On the other hand, Sheehy
(2005) and Gabaldon (2006) suggested that sacrificing
profits in the public interest is entirely allowed since
corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities that
extend to a wide variety of potential stakeholders. In
addition, Lyon and Maxwell (2004) and Vogel(2006)
pointed out that firms with high corporate
performance frequently combined profit maximizing
project and social responsible activities. These also
suggest that social responsible activities do not
always reduce corporate value, it sometimes
accelerates it. Our empirical results regarding
shareholder’s value and total factor productivity
show that this idea can be a possible explanation why
Sukuk issuers are increasing in the Islamic bond
market. Sukuk issuance is used not only as a
corporate funding tool, but also used because it
financially and ethically brings high benefit. Jensen et
al. (2002), Heinkel et al. (2001) and Graff Zivin and
Small (2005) pointed out that these social responsible
activities not only improves the consumer’s
credibility, but also increase corporate value through
an increase in additional equity investment from the
emphatizing external investors.
The main conclusion of this paper is that
Sukuk issuance and the Islamic bank borrowings are
used by firms with different characteristics, sdifferent
purpose and different funding orders. Therefore,
benefits that users receive from the funding tool are
different between Sukuk and Islamic bank
borrowings. This paper does not employ the direct
qualitative survey to examine the above corporate
purpose, etc., but we regard our empirical results of
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stock price effect and post issuance productivity
support our hypotheses that Sukuk issuance is used
to enhance the competitiveness in the product market.
This is also the reason why non-Islamic multinational
firms made new entry in the Sukuk market.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Empirical evidences from this paper
suggest that users of Sukuk and Islamic bank
borrowing are different and the purpose of the use is
also different. Accordingly, funding order of these
financial schemes is also different. Both financial
schemes are used by large firms that have past
experiences of this type of funding, but the Islamic
bank borrowing has an industrial sectoral bias, i.e.
borrowers are mainly real estate business or urban
development business firms. More than anything,
Sukuk issuance is not possibly regarded as a primary
funding tool. In this regard, although a firm’s social
responsible ethical custom may in general reduce the
shareholder’s value in many industrial countries, this
ethically desirable Islamic finance increases the
shareholder’s value and improve the issuer’s
productivity. This is what we would like to
emphasize in our discussion based on the empirical
results. The above finding is the reason why foreign
investors increase the investment in Sukuk and the
equity of the issuers and improve their corporate
performance in the product market in the
post-issuance period. These are our study’s main
conclusions, but some of them are not directly
derived from the survey. In particular, this paper did
not directly examine the possible relationship
between corporate ethical custom and the Sukuk
issuance. In addition, we employed total factor
productivity as a proxy of market competiveness in a
product market. Future studies can verify the
relationship between final consumer’s credibility and
firm’s productivity in a post issuance period.
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APPENDIX 1: Explanation of Data Employed in Study
1. Number of Sukuk Issuers and Non-Issuers
Note: Author’s estimates based on ISI Emerging Markets.
2. Number of Sukuk Issuers and Non-Issuers by Type
Note: Author’s estimates based on ISI Emerging Markets
3. Number of Islamic Bank Borrowers
(A) Sukuk Issuers (B) Normal Bond Issuers Total
(a) All (b) Listed Firms (a) All (b) Listed Firms
2002 4 0 303 25 708 708
2003 25 10 112 27 763 773
2004 48 14 158 42 834 848
2005 71 18 375 41 904 922
2006 150 18 390 42 924 942
2007 116 16 505 71 953 969
414 76 1,843 248 5,086 5,162
(C) Non-Sukuk
Issuers
(A) Sukuk Issuers by
Type
(B) Listed Issuers by Type (B)/(A) (a)～(e)/(B)
(a) Ijara Sukuk 57 4 7.0% 5.4%
(b) Musharakah Sukuk 46 2 4.3% 2.7%
(c) Mudarabah Sukuk 10 3 30.0% 4.1%
(d) BBA 82 14 17.1% 18.9%
(e) Others 219 51 23.3% 68.9%
(f) Total 414 74 17.9% 100.0%
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Note: Author’s estimates based on ISI Emerging Markets
4. Number of Islamic Bank Borrowers by Country
Note: Author’s estimates based on ISI Emerging Markets
(A) Islamic Borrowers (B) Non-Islamic Borrowers (C) Total
(a) All (b) Listed Firms
2004 16 4 437 441
2005 28 9 485 494
2006 39 11 511 522
2007 86 12 465 477
169 36 1,898 1,934
(A) Islamic Borrowers (B) Listed Borrowers (B)/(A) (a)～(e)/(B)
(a) Saudi Arabia 62 8 12.9% 22.2%
(b) United Arab Emirates 63 11 17.5% 30.6%
(c）Kuwait 15 7 46.7% 19.4%
(d) Qatar 20 6 30.0% 16.7%
(e) Oman 3 1 33.3% 2.8%
(f) Bahrain 38 3 7.9% 8.3%
Total 201 36 17.9% 100.0%
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APPENDIX 2: Basic Concept and Scheme of Islamic Finance by Type
The chart below presents the flow of
funds of Islamic finance scheme by selected type.
Mudarabah and Ijara are indicated because
these financial schemes represent and symbolize
Islamic finance. As noted in section II of this
paper, these two schemes account for 26 percent
of Sukuk market in 2007. The remaining 74
percent are accounted for by Murabahah,
Musharakah and others. As interest
payment/receipt is forbidden by shariah,
invstors/depositors receive benefit as dividend
from the net profit of the project. In case of
Mudarabah, investor/depositors are separated
from the project, but are considered project
participants in the case of Musharakah. Under
Ijarah scheme, which recorded the most
dramatic development, fund raisers first
establish a special purpose company (SPC), sell
their fixed assets and this SPC provides the
leasing facility for the production. This SPC
issues Sukuk asset backed by the leased fixed
assets.
(A) Mudarabah
(a) Mudarabah Sukuk Issuance (b) Mudarabah Bank Facility
(B) Ijara Sukuk
Investors
Firm
Project
Depositors
Bank
Project
Investment
Project ManagementOperational
Profit
Dividend Deposit
Investment/LoanOperational Profit
Dividend
Investors
1. Establish new SPC and
the SPC purchase fixed
asset from the firm
SPC
2. Cash
Firm
3. Lease
Payment
5.
Cash
4. Bond
Issuance
